FEW people even in Conservative HQ thought that their party could possibly come out of Britain’s general election with a clearer mandate than it had going in. Governing parties tend to lose votes as gripes are laid at their door. And Britain has been through a grinding economic slump, which has crushed real wages. Yet the impossible seems to have happened.
As The Economist went to press, with most of the votes counted, it seemed that the Conservative Party would win more seats than it had done in 2010. It will certainly be much the largest party. Labour fell even further behind, mostly because the Scottish National Party (SNP) bulldozed it north of the border. The Liberal Democrats, who entered government with the Tories in 2010, looked set to lose most of their MPs, an even worse outcome than had been expected.
So it was a night that far exceeded Tory expectations. But such is the ragged state of British politics that David Cameron looks condemned to preside over a government that will be weaker than the coalition he has run for the past five years, even as this election has deepened the problems Britain faces. The Tories must strengthen a fragile economy, manage the uncertainty of a referendum on Europe and salvage a union with Scotland that is falling apart.
More popular, but weaker
Governments with small majorities or none at all can get things done, if they rustle up allies and their opponents are divided or feeble. A minority government overhauled Sweden’s state in the mid-1990s; a decade later a Canadian one legalised gay marriage. Yet such administrations are more often fragile and short-lived, particularly in Britain. The Labour governments of the 1970s were preoccupied with mere survival: sick MPs were dragged to the Commons for late-night votes, sometimes with tubes protruding from their bodies.
A strong result for conservatives, a difficult election for Britain
And MPs were far more obedient then. These days many are almost one-man and one-woman parties, who cultivate their Twitter followings and defy the whips. The 2010-15 parliament saw more backbench rebellions than any since the second world war. The next government might see even more, not least from the gaggle of irreconcilable Eurosceptics on the Conservative backbenches.
To minimise this risk, Mr Cameron would ideally thrash out another coalition agreement with the remaining Liberal Democrats who, despite their depleted numbers, would be a moderating force and could shore up his government. The chances are, however, that he will prefer to go it alone, wagering that a badly weakened Labour Party will be unable to unite enough opposition MPs to bring him down. This course will leave Mr Cameron more beholden to his irascible backbenchers. And it will make sensible policy less likely.
Start with the economy. Mr Cameron’s first task is to lay out a credible plan for reducing Britain’s budget deficit at a prudent pace—one that eschews both the draconian spending cuts and the tax giveaways that appeal to his party’s backbenchers. The second, and greater, economic priority is to improve Britain’s chronically low productivity. That will require investment in infrastructure, including unpopular things like new runways in south-east England. It will involve building many more houses, especially in and around the big cities where productivity is highest and workers want to live. And it means accelerating the reform of public services, particularly the education revolution, which has seen thousands of schools given power to manage themselves. In many of these areas, Mr Cameron will find the opposition of his own MPs as much of a problem as the Labour Party.
Europe is especially dangerous for the Conservatives. Under pressure from Eurosceptics in his party, Mr Cameron promised to spend two years renegotiating Britain’s place in the EU before holding an in-out referendum by the end of 2017. Setting such a firm deadline was foolish: there is a real risk that, in the mid-term doldrums, British voters will sever their country’s relationship with its most important trading partner. But Mr Cameron has no option but to stick with it.
The difficulty will be calibrating Britain’s demands. Ask for too much and he will come home empty-handed. Win too little from Brussels and he will lose too many of his own party for his government to survive. He should avoid all talk of treaty change (which European governments are unlikely to countenance) and focus instead on cutting red tape, extending the single market and cracking down on welfare tourism. Then he should spin every slight achievement as a mighty victory.
Scotland poses a bigger problem. The Nationalists’ triumph was almost complete and they now have a large foothold in the parliament of a country that they wish to dismember. A second independence referendum in the next few years seems increasingly likely. English resentment of Scotland is growing, and is particularly strong among Tory backbenchers. One way out of this bind is for Mr Cameron to move more boldly towards far-reaching devolution. That might restore some Scottish faith in Westminster. And the country’s rent-seeking political culture will end only when the Scottish government has power over finances.
At least improve the system
The SNP vote was part of a widespread rejection of Westminster politics. The solution for that involves fixing Britain’s broken electoral system. The SNP won about 5% of the popular vote in Britain and more than 50 seats. The UK Independence Party won about 10% of the vote but seemed likely to end up with one or two seats. With the relationship between votes and MPs in the Commons now almost random, the first-past-the-post method of allocating seats has clearly failed.
The case for topping up this creaking system with proportional representation, something this newspaper has long supported, has now become overwhelming. Tory backbenchers will object, but Mr Cameron might get enough support from others to override them—and would transform British politics for the better. For a weak government, that would be an impressive achievement.